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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the opinion and
judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals (attached as Addendumix A) pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).  The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion
from which this appeal is taken on July 29, 2016.  The Utah Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the underlying appeal to the Court of Appeal from the District Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A. Issues Presented
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District
Court properly applied Rule 26(d)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
rather than Rule 16(d), to its determination of the appropriate sanction
for Appellant’s failure to timely disclose expert testimony.
See Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶¶ 12, 18-21, 381 P.3d
1135; see also Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3; 22:2-25; and 23:12-24:19]
(Addendum B).
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Appellant from using
an untimely expert report under Rule 26(d) to contest summary
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judgment when it excluded the report based only on a finding that the
failure to disclose was not justified.
See Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶ 18 n. 8, 381 P.3d
1135; see also Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3; 22:2-25; and 23:12-24:19]
(Addendum B).
B.  Standard of Review
This Court reviews a court’s decision whether to sanction a party under
Rules 16(d) or 26(d)(4), as well as the selection of an appropriate sanction, for an
abuse of discretion.  Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 20, 349 P.3d 739, 745, Boice
ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, ¶ 8 & n. 3, 982 P.2d  565.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES
The following provisions are important to a proper resolution of this appeal:
A. Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d)
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If a party or a party’s attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a
party’s attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party’s
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if
a party or a party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court,
upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by
Rule 37(e).
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B. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(e)(2)(2014)
Rule 37(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure previously provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:1
Unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the
court, upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to
follow its orders, including the following:
(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing
designated matters into evidence; ....
(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the
pleadings, or render judgment by default on all or part of the
action; 
 
C. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4)
Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.
 
D. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)(2014)
Rule 37(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure previously provided as
follows:2
1  Rule 36(e)(2) was renumbered on May 1, 2015 as Rule 37(b).
2  On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered and the wording of some of the
permissible sanctions changed.  The version of Rule 37 in effect prior to May 1,
2015 is quoted above.  See Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 19 n. 3, 349 P.3d 739. 
(continued...)
-3-
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document  or other material ... as
required by  Rule 26(d), that  party  shall not  be permitted to use the
witness,  document or other material at any hearing unless the failure
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to
disclose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case is before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Ms. Baumann, through counsel, had previously filed a timely Notice of Appeal from
the District Court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Order of Final Judgment.  Rec. at 524-520 (attached as Addendum B).  The Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, 381 P.3d 1135 (attached as
Addendum A).
B. Statement of Facts
Background
This case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Kari Baumann, Defendant-Appellee
The Kroger Company, doing business as Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 (“Smith’s
Pharmacy” or “the Pharmacy”), and Defendant-Appellee Gregory P. Tayler, M.D.
2(...continued)
As noted above, the same language is now reflected in Rule 26(d)(4).
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(“Dr. Tayler” or “the Doctor”), collectively, Defendants-Appellees.  The case is a
medical malpractice action alleging breaches by the Pharmacy and the Doctor of the
standards of care and duty that it owed to Ms. Baumann in the prescription and
dispensing of medications.
Allegations Against the Doctor
Ms. Baumann, through counsel, filed her Complaint in the District Court on
February 27, 2013.  The Complaint alleges that, from June 2004 through September
2006, Dr. Tayler prescribed two medications for the treatment of Ms. Baumann’s
high blood pressure.  Ms. Baumann filled the prescriptions at Smith’s Pharmacy. 
Ms. Baumann’s health insurer advised her by form letter to consult with her
physician concerning a possible, less expensive alternative medication to one of the
medications.  Dr. Tayler renewed Ms. Baumann’s prescription for one of the original
medications and then also the alternative medication, but without discontinuing the
prior prescription.  Both prescriptions were prescribed in the highest available dose. 
Rec. at 11-10, ¶¶ 13-21.  Dr. Tayler admitted in his Answer that he had prescribed
the original medication and then “inadvertently” prescribed the duplicative
medication that tripled her dosage.  Rec. at 42, ¶ 9.
The Complaint also alleges that the duplicative prescriptions caused a sudden
and substantial change in Ms. Baumann’s anti-hypertensive regimen.  Dr. Tayler also
did not take Baumann’s blood pressure or perform any other examination of his
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patient when deciding to renew her prescription for the original prescription or the
alternative prescriptions; and did not do so until February 19, 2007, 15 days after
Ms. Baumann suffered an acute anti-hypertensive event on February 4, 2007. 
Dr. Tayler did not inform Ms. Baumann that there were substantial and significant
risks in simultaneously prescribing duplicative anti-hypertensive drugs for her or that
there were substantial and significant risks in prescribing these drugs in these
dosages for her without checking blood pressure or doing a physical exam.  Rec. at
10-9, ¶¶ 22-26.
Allegations Against the Pharmacy
The Complaint further alleges that, on January 18, 2007, Ms. Baumann arrived
in person at Smith’s Pharmacy, where employees of The Kroger Company
simultaneously filled Dr. Tayler’s duplicative prescriptions for her.  Smith’s
Pharmacy had actual knowledge that the alternative medication was a “new”
medication for her, as confirmed by the receipt for her purchase.  Smith’s Pharmacy
also instructed Ms. Baumann to take the duplicative medications just as prescribed
by Dr. Tayler and failed to warn her that they were duplicative drugs or that there
were any special risks associated with taking the duplicative drugs in the dosages
prescribed.  Rec. at 9-8, ¶¶ 26-29.
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Ms. Baumann’s Injuries Caused by the Over-Medication
Soon after Ms. Baumann began taking the duplicative prescriptions as
prescribed by Dr. Tayler and as instructed by Smith’s Pharmacy, she collapsed in an
acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007.  She lost consciousness, lost motor
control and lost bladder and bowel control.  Ms. Baumann was immediately taken
to the Emergency Room at Heber Valley Hospital.  The assessment of the ER
physician who discharged her from the ER was “hypotension due to over-
medication.”  Rec. at 8, 30-34; see also Kari L. Baumann v. Michael J. Astrue,  
2:12-CV-00713-EJF, Memorandum Decision and Order, 194 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service
468, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142135, *4, 2013 WL 5435321 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2013)
at p. 3 (so finding).
Since her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007, Ms. Baumann has had
persistent neurological impairments, including slurred speech, visual deficits,
cognitive deficits and other physical impairments.  On December 13, 2007, the Utah
Department of Health entered its Final Agency Order, adopting the prior
Recommended Decision of its Hearing Officer, who found that Ms. Baumann had
been and was disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 since the date of
her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007.  Rec. at 7, ¶¶ 35-36.
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Causes of Actions Asserted Below
In her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a medical malpractice claim
against Dr. Tayler for his alleged breach of the standard of care applicable to the
prescription of medications; and a claim against Dr. Tayler based on his alleged
failure to provide informed consent.  Rec. at 7-5, ¶¶ 37-44.
Also in her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a malpractice claim
against Smith’s Pharmacy based on its alleged breach of the standard of care
expected of licensed pharmacists; a claim against Smiths’ Pharmacy that it violated
Utah’s Pharmacy Practice Act at § 58-17b-601(1)(a) and, in particular, Utah’s
Pharmacy Practice Act Rule R156-17b promulgated pursuant to the Act; and a claim
against Smith’s Pharmacy that it failed to comply with its undertaking of voluntarily-
assumed duties and written assurance.  Rec. at 5-2, ¶¶ 45-61.
The Proceedings in the District Court
The original Notice of Event Due Dates issued by the Court, reflecting the due
dates set forth in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was filed by the
Court on June 19, 2013.  Rec. at 44.  Pursuant to a Stipulation for Additional Time
to Conduct Standard Discovery filed with the Court on March 7, 2014, counsel for
Defendants-Appellees and Ms. Baumann, who was proceeding pro se at the time,
agreed that the deadline for fact discovery would be May 30, 2014, that
Ms. Baumann’s expert disclosures were due by June 6, 2015, and that expert
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discovery would be completed by September 5, 2014.  Rec. at 87-86; and 452-51,
¶ 1.  Rec. at 87-86; see also Rec. at 451, ¶ 6.  No certificate of readiness for trial was
ever filed and no trial date was ever set.  See Rec. at 44 and 87.
On September 11, 2014, Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy filed a Joint Motion
for Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum.  Rec. at 97, 142.  The sole
argument raised by Dr. Taylor and the Pharmacy in their supporting Memorandum
was that, because of the lack of an expert, Ms. Baumann could not establish the
applicable standards of care, a breach of those standards, and that the breach was the
proximate cause of the injuries to Ms. Baumann.  Rec. at 139.  On September 29,
2014, Ms. Baumann filed a Statement Opposing Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment.  On October 8, 2014, Dr. Taylor and the Pharmacy filed a joint Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and a Request to Submit for Decision and
Request for Oral Argument.  The Court set oral argument for November 17, 2014. 
Rec. at  97, 142, 152, 158; see also Rec. at 451, ¶¶ 2-5
On October 10, 2014, Ms. Baumann filed a second Memorandum in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Doctor and the
Pharmacy.  By way of that second Memorandum, Ms. Baumann sought to introduce,
among other documents, a decision by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
concerning the issue whether she was disabled, a transcript of the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge in that proceeding that included expert testimony and
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final decision of the SSA following a remand by the United States District Court for
the District of Utah.  See Rec. at 325-169.  On November 4, 2014, the Doctor and the
Pharmacy filed an additional Reply Memorandum  and then, on November 7, 2014,
an Amended Notice to Submit for Decision.  Rec. at 346 and 350.
On November 12, 2014, five days before oral argument, Ms. Baumann
provided counsel for the Doctor and the Pharmacy with an expert report and
curriculum vitae applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by the Pharmacy. 
On November 15, 2014, Ms. Baumann also filed the same expert report in response
to the Reply Memorandum filed by Defendants-Appellees and also a request to the
Court to admit the report in response to their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Ms. Baumann did not serve or file a separate expert report applicable to the alleged
breaches and failures  by Dr. Tayler.  See Rec. at 451, ¶¶ 6-7; 383-81; and 380-351.
The Court first conducted oral argument on the Motion for Summary
Judgment on November 17, 2014.  During the proceeding, Ms. Baumann sought
permission from the Court to allow her husband to speak for her in light of her
cognitive disabilities that include difficulty communicating, staying focused, staying
on task and other issues.  Counsel for Defendants-Appellees objected, the Court
declined Ms. Baumann’s request because her husband was not a licensed attorney,
and the Court permitted her to retain counsel to represent her.  Rec. at 519 [4:24-6:8]
(transcript attached as Addendum E).  The Court also ordered that any materials filed
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after October 8, 2014 (the date of the first Notice to Submit) would not be considered
by the Court in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants-
Appellees and that Ms. Baumann could have until January 5, 2015 to retain counsel. 
Rec. at 519 [8:17-9:16; 15:4-11; 10:7-11:18; and 19:6-11] (transcript attached as
Addendum E).  A written Order reflecting these decisions was then approved and
entered by the Court on December 22, 2014.  In that Order, the Court states that it
would not consider any documents served or filed after October 8, 2014.  Rec.
at 401-400 (Order attached as Addendum D); see also Rec. at 450, ¶¶ 8-9.
The Court held the second hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by the Doctor and the Pharmacy on January 5, 2015.  Ms. Baumann continued to
represent herself pro se.  During oral argument, Ms. Baumann argued, among other
points, that the Court should decide summary judgment based on the record that she
had submitted, the decision of the SSA, and the report of the expert witness that she
had filed and served, not based on a procedural error on her part.  Ms. Baumann also
made clear that her failure to disclose an expert and then her untimely disclosure of
an expert were not intentional.  See Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3 and 22:2-25] (transcript
attached as Addendum C).
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The Decision of the District Court
At the close of that second hearing, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy.  The District Court
concluded that Ms. Baumann “failed to make expert disclosures as required by the
Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that there is no good cause for Plaintiff’s failure
to make expert disclosures.”  Rec. 5238.  Applying Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court concluded that Ms. Baumann was precluded from using
any undisclosed report.3  The Court further determined that Ms. Baumann’s claims
were based on standards of care and issues of proximate causation that were not
within the common knowledge of laypersons.  Therefore, the Court concluded,
Ms. Baumann was unable to establish a prima facie case that the standards of care
were breached or that any breach proximately caused injury to her.  Rec. at 528-27
(decision attached as Addendum B); see also Rec. at 486 [23:12-24:19] (transcript
attached as Addendum C).
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court, concluding
that the District Court properly applied the standard enunciated in Rule 26(d) of the
3  The District Court did not mention Rule 16(d) and made no finding whether
the failure to disclose the expert report by the deadline set forth in the Stipulation
was harmless.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  In so doing, the Court of Appeals rejected
Ms. Baumann’s argument that the permissive and more lenient standard set forth in
Rule 16 rather than the mandatory standard set forth in Rule 26 should apply. 
Ms. Baumann had argued that, under the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Coroles
v. State, 20156 UT 48, 349 P.3d 739, the appropriate source of the District Court’s
authority to sanction her for producing an untimely expert report under the
Stipulation, adopted by the District Court as the basis of its decision, is Rule 16(d),
not Rule 26(d).  Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶ 12, 381 P.3d 1135.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals applied the reasoning of its
decision in Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62, 370 P.3d
963, which addressed a failure to serve initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1). 
Bauman v. The Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶¶ 18-19, 381 P.3d 1135.  In Sleepy
Holdings, the appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it
excluded evidence under Rule 26 and that it should instead have applied the
discretionary sanctions found in Rule 16(d).  Id. ¶ 19.  In Sleepy Holdings, the Court
of Appeals explained that Rule 16 “governs pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
management conferences,” id. ¶ 20, whereas [R]ule 26 “governs initial disclosures
and discovery,” id. ¶ 21.  The Court of Appeals declined to apply Coroles, as the
appellant had urged, because, the Court decided, Coroles does not interpret or even
mention Rule 26 and because Rule 26 properly authorized sanctions for the failure
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to disclose.  Id. ¶ 23.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded in the instant case,
the District Court properly treated Ms. Baumann’s failure to timely disclose an
expert report under the parties’ Stipulation not as a failure to make a timely
disclosure under a scheduling order but as a failure to disclose.  Baumann v. Kroger
Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶¶ 18-21, 381 P.3d 1135.
The Court of Appeals also rejected Ms. Baumann’s argument that, in addition
to making a finding of no good cause, the District Court was also required to make
a finding of harmlessness.  The Court of Appeals stated that “a district court’s
exclusion of materials may be supported if the court makes a finding that there is
either no good cause for the failure or that the failure is harmful.”  Baumann v.
Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶ 18 n. 8, 381 P.3d 1135 (citing Utah R. Civ. P.
26(d)(4) and Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 35, 215 P.3d 933).  The Court
of Appeals thus interpreted Rule 26(d)(4) to permit a district court to exclude
evidence based on a finding by the court of either prong of the two-part test set forth
in the Rule.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the
judgment entered by the District Court, and remand this case to the District Court
with instructions to the District Court consistent with this Court’s opinion.  The
Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the District Court’s application of
-14-
Rule 26(d)(4) to exclude an expert report that was untimely under a Stipulation
adopted by the Court as the source of the applicable deadline conflicts with this
Court’s decision in Coroles.  Moreover, even if Rule 26(d)(4) were the proper source
for imposition of sanctions in the situation presented here, the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of Rule 26(d)(4) to require only a showing of a lack of justification
conflicts with the plain language of Rule 26(d)(4) requiring exclusion “unless the
failure is harmless or the party shows substantial justification.”
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED RULE 26(d)(4) OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RATHER THAN RULE 16(d), TO 
ITS DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR
MS. BAUMANN’S FAILURE TO TIMELY DISCLOSE HER EXPERT
REPORT. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals – applying Rule 26(d) rather than Rule
16(d) to exclude an expert report that was untimely under a stipulation adopted by
the court – conflicts with this Court’s decision in Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, 349
P.3d 739.  In Coroles, this Court made clear that the more lenient standard set forth
in Rule 16(d), not the stricter standard set forth in Rule 37(h), applies when, as here,
a part produces untimely discovery under a scheduling order.  2015 UT 48, ¶ 20. 
Specifically, the Court held that Rule 16(d) is the  source of a district court’s
authority to sanction a party for  producing untimely discovery under a scheduling
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order.  Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 20 (citing Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71,
¶ 8 & n. 3, 982 P.2d 565 and Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d  1307, 1309-10 (Utah
1993)).
In arriving at this conclusion, this Court noted that Rule 16(d) gives the district
court “‘broad authority to manage a case.’” Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 19 (quoting
Boice, 1999 UT 71, ¶ 8).  Under this Rule, the Supreme Court noted, a district court
may “‘establish[] the  time to complete discovery’” through a scheduling order. 
Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.  16(a)(9)).  The Supreme Court
also stated that, if a party fails to obey a scheduling  order establishing a discovery
deadline, the district court “‘may take any action authorized by Rule 37(e)’” of the
Utah  Rules of Civil Procedure.  Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ.
P. 16(d)).  The Supreme Court further noted that permissible sanctions for providing
untimely discovery  include “‘prohibit[ing] the disobedient party ... from 
introducing designated matters into evidence’” or “‘order[ing]  the party or the
attorney to pay the reasonable expenses,  including attorney fees, caused by the
failure.’” Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.  37(e)(2)(B) and (E);
and citing Boice, 1999 UT 71, ¶ 8  (“If a  party fails to obey a date set under Rule 16,
-16-
the court may  sanction the offending party by excluding evidence the  party intends
to present.”)).4
The Supreme Court noted that the difference between the standard for
sanctioning a party under Rule 16(d) and the standard for  sanctioning a party under 
Rule 37(h) is meaningful.  The Court pointed out that Rule 16(d) provides that a
court “may” impose a sanction described in Rule 37(e) for a failure to abide by the 
scheduling order.  By contrast, the Court noted, Rule 37(h) provides that, if a party
fails to disclose a witness, the party “shall not” be permitted to use the witness
“‘unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose.’” Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 22.  Thus, the Court added, Rule 16(d)
leaves the decision whether to sanction a party to the district court’s broad discretion,
while Rule 37(h) shifts the burden to the nondisclosing party to show why the
evidence should not be excluded.  Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 22.
4  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Coroles specifically
repudiated the prior decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals to the extent that those
cases suggest that Rule 37(h) should be applied when discovery is produced after a
deadline set forth in a scheduling order.  2015 UT 48, ¶ 23 (citing and referring
specifically to Spafford v. Granite Credit Union, 2011 UT App 401, ¶ 16,  266 P.3d
866 (reviewing the exclusion of an expert witness  designated after the scheduling
order deadline under the  standard established in current  rule  37(h)); Brussow v. 
Webster, 2011 UT App 193, ¶¶ 3-4, 258 P.3d 615 (same); Lippman v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Brokerage Co.,  2010 UT App 89, at *2  (same); and Posner v.
Equity Title Ins.  Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ¶ 23, 222 P.3d 775 (same)).
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It follows from all of this that the District Court committed reversible error
when it excluded the untimely expert witness report submitted by Ms. Baumann. 
Here, the source of the deadline for disclosure of expert reports was found not
standard provision set forth in Rule 26, and the Notice of Event Due Dates that
identified those deadlines; but, instead, in the Stipulation to which the parties agreed
that was filed with the Court.  Indeed, the District Court relied specifically on the
Stipulation and, in so doing, adopted that deadline as the scheduling order applicable
to the case and relied on that Stipulation as the basis of its decision to exclude Ms.
Baumann’s expert report.  “Although courts have discretion to sanction parties for
violating a scheduling order, an  exercise of discretion guided by an erroneous legal
conclusion is reversible.”  Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 24 (reversing district court’s order
excluding untimely expert reports, because the decision was based on an application of Rule
37(h) and not Rule 16(d)).  Accordingly, it is clear that this Court should reverse the District
Court’s exclusion of the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann.  See id.
It is equally clear that excluding the untimely expert report under Rule 16(d) in the
circumstances presented here would likewise be an abuse of discretion.  Addressing the
issue whether a Court should exclude expert testimony based on an untimely disclosure, the
Utah Supreme Court offered the following admonition in Colores:
[W]here the exclusion of  an expert is tantamount to the dismissal of the
lawsuit, as is  the case here, the district court should exercise restraint in
choosing this grave step rather than a lesser sanction.
-18-
Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 29 (citing Moore’s Federal Practice §  16.92[5][c][i] (3d ed. 2014)
and Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, ¶ 10, 235 P.3d 791  (“Excluding a
witness from  testifying is . . . extreme in nature and . . . should be employed only with
caution and restraint.”).  Relevant factors applicable here that counsel strongly in favor of
not excluding the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann include the fact that
she was representing herself pro se, that she had and has cognitive difficulties, that there is
no evidence that she intentionally missed the applicable deadline, that the case had not been
certified for trial and no trial date had been set, and that there could be no cognizable
prejudice to the Doctor or the Pharmacy except for the need for a new scheduling order and
delay in the eventual trial date.  See Colores, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 28.
 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING
MS. BAUMANN FROM USING AN UNTIMELY EXPERT REPORT
UNDER RULE 26(d) TO CONTEST SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT
EXCLUDED THE REPORT BASED ONLY ON A FINDING THAT THE
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals – requiring a finding under Rule 26(d)(4) of
only a lack of justification – conflicts with the plain language of Rule 26(d)(4) and well-
settled interpretations of that language.  Even if Rule 26(d)(4) were the proper source for
imposition of sanctions in the circumstances presented here, which, as we have made clear,
it is not, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Rule 26(d)(4) requires a finding only of a
lack of justification conflicts with the plain language of that Rule.  It provides:
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If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to
discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or
material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure.
(Emphasis added.)  The Court of Appeals, for its part, stated that “[i]t is well settled that a
district court’s exclusion of materials may be supported if the court makes a finding that
there is either no good cause for the failure or that the failure is harmful.”  Baumann v. The
Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ¶ 18 n. 8, 381 P.3d 1135. In support of this conclusion, the
Court of Appeals cites to and quotes from Rule 26(d)(4).  Id.  Yet, the plain language of
Rule 26(d)(4) requires mandatory exclusion when there has been a failure to disclose –
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or unless the party shows good cause for the failure. 
Clearly, this is not drafted from the point of view of the district court, requiring the court to
make a finding of only one or the other prior to exclusion.  If it were, the Rule would say
that the district court shall exclude the materials if the court finds either that the failure to
disclose was not harmless or that the party lacked good cause for the failure.  Rather, the
Rue is, fairly obviously, drafted to require a district court to exclude materials unless the
court finds one or the other alternative.  Accordingly, before deciding to exclude evidence
for a Rule 26 violation, a district court must make a finding as to both alternatives and
conclude both that the party lacked justification for the failure and that the failure to comply
was not harmless.
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Likewise, the citation by the Court of Appeals’ to this Court’s decision in Bodell
Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 35, 215 P.3d 933 does nothing to support application
of only one prong of the required two-part analysis.  In Bodell, the appellant had argued that
it had good cause for its failure to disclose its computation of damages as required under
Rule 26 when it disclosed its theories of damages during fact discovery and later laid them
out in greater detail in an expert report disclosed during the expert discovery period.  This
Court was unpersuaded by that argument, concluding that its original disclosure was
insufficient.  In addition, this Court also concluded that the failure to disclose a proper
computation of damages would have prejudiced the appellees.  Therefore, this Court
affirmed the decision to exclude the report.  Id.  Thus, this Court did not, as the Court of
Appeals seems to suggest in the decision below, rely only on a showing under Rule 26(d)(4)
of a lack of good cause but, instead, also concluded that the failure to disclose was in fact
prejudicial to the opposing parties.  See id. 
Finally, the interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Utah’s Rule 26(d)(4), formerly
found in Rule 37(h), is inconsistent with the interpretation given by the federal courts to
Rule 37(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 37(c) provides as follows:
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule
26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to
supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless ....
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In considering whether to expert testimony should be barred under this Rule for a Rule 26
violation, the federal courts will not exclude materials if the violation is either not
substantially justified or harmless.  See, e.g., Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield
of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the district court that a failure
to disclose under Rule 26(a)(1) was either justified or harmless under Rule 37(c)); Trost v.
Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998) (Rules 26(a) and 37(c) “permit a
court to exclude untimely evidence unless the failure to disclose was either harmless or
substantially justified”); Clark v. Wilkin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45962, *6 (D. Utah June
10, 2008) (concluding that exclusion of untimely supplemental disclosure under Rule
26(a)(1) was not proper, because, though the plaintiff’s disclosure was not substantially
justified, it was harmless).5
It follows from all of this that, even applying Rule 26(d)(4), the District Court should
have considered whether the failure to disclose was harmless.  As this Court admonished
in Coroles, “where the exclusion of  an expert is tantamount to the dismissal of the lawsuit,
5    See also, e.g., Rembrandt Vision Technologies, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson
Vision, 725 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (party seeking to avoid sanctions may
show substantial justification or harmlessness); R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn.,
673 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2012) (same).  In so doing, the courts consider
whether “‘(1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is
offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which
introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the moving party’s bad
faith or willfulness.’”  Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir.
2002) (quoting Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d
985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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as is  the case here, the district court should exercise restraint in  choosing this grave step
rather than a lesser sanction.”  Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 29 (citations omitted).  Exercising
such restraint, even under Rue 26(d)(4), the District Court should not have excluded the
untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann.  In fact, the record shows that
Ms. Baumann was not only representing herself pro se but that, as a result of the incident
at issue, she suffers from serious cognitive difficulties that include difficulty staying on task,
slurred speech and lack of focus.  Further, there is no actual evidence that Ms. Baumann
intentionally missed the applicable deadline.  In reality, she simply did not understand her
obligations and burdens in a complex medical malpractice case like this one.  Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, there is simply no cognizable prejudice whatsoever.  A mere
delay in a case is not cognizable prejudice sufficient to justify the severe sanction imposed
here.  See Colores, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 28.  Indeed, this case had not been certified as ready for
trial, no trial date had been set, and the Court continued the November 17, 2014 hearing on
the Motion for Summary Judgment to January 5, 2015.  In these circumstances, even
applying Rule 26(d)(4), exclusion of the untimely expert report would not be fitting.  See
Colores, 2015 UT 48, ¶ 28.6
6  This approach is in keeping with the approach taken by federal courts when,
as here, exclusion of evidence as a sanction would result in dismissal of a claim. 
See, e.g., R & R Sails, Inc., 673 F.3d at 1247-48 (stating that, because sanction
amounted to dismissal of a claim, the district court was required, in making
harmlessness inquiry, to consider whether the claimed noncompliance involved
(continued...)
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This is the appropriate result.  In the context of considering whether a district court
properly excluded evidence because a party’s failed to comply with rule 26(a) or (e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Tenth Circuit has explained:  “The parties to a
litigation are not merely players in a game, trying to catch each other out.  Rather, litigation
should promote the finding of the truth, and, wherever possible, the resolution of cases on
their merits.”  Gillum v. United States, 309 F. App’x 267, 270 (10th Cir. 2009).  In the end,
this principle is in keeping with this Court’s “general judicial policy that favors a trial on the
merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment.”  King v.
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted)); see also
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107 (Utah 1992) (so stating).
6(...continued)
willfulness, fault, or bad faith); Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 296 (2d
Cir. 2006) (requiring the district court to consider the possibility of a continuance);
S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 597 (4th Cir.
2003) (requiring consideration of the surprise to the party against whom the evidence
would be offered and the ability of that party to cure the surprise); Tex. A & M
Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2003)
(requiring consideration of the possibility that a continuance would cure prejudice
to the opposing party).
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CONCLUSION
The Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment
entered by the District Court, and remand this case with instructions to the District Court,
consistent with this Court’s opinion.  Further, this Court should order that, if it becomes
necessary for the District Court to address the issue of sanctions for the untimely designation
of the expert, the District Court may choose a sanction short of exclusion of the experts if
it determines a sanction is appropriate under Rule 16(d).
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of December 2016:
/s/ Gregory W. Stevens
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Attorney for Appellant
Kari L. Baumann
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SENIOR JUDGE p AMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in 
which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY 
concurred.1 
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge: 
11 Kari L. Baumann appeals the district court's grant of 
summary judgment against her. Baumann failed to designate 
any expert witnesses under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the district court consequently precluded her 
1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-
201(6). 
Baumann v. The Kroger Company 
from using undesignated experts to contest summary judgment 
under the same rule. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 Baumann first filed suit against The Kroger Company 
(Kroger) and Dr. Gregory P. Tayler (collectively, Defendants) in 
2007 after she allegedly suffered "hypotension due to 
overmedication." That complaint was dismissed upon 
stipulation of the parties. In February 2013, Baumann filed the 
instant action pursuant to Utah's one-year savings statute.2 In 
her new complaint, Baumann alleged that Dr. Tayler had 
breached the applicable standard of care in prescribing her 
medications. She also alleged that Kroger had breached its 
standard of care, violated Utah's Pharmacy Practice Act, and 
failed to comply with its assumed duties and written assurances 
to her. After her attorney withdrew as counsel, Baumann 
represented herself pro se. 
13 A year later, in February 2014, as part of pretrial 
discovery, Baumann replied to Defendants' interrogatories 
requesting that she "[i]dentify each person [she] intend[ed] to 
call as a witness . . . including expert witnesses" and their 
anticipated testimonies. In reply, Baumann wrote that she would 
identify such "witnesses and their anticipated testimony ... 
when scheduled to do so by case management order." Two 
weeks later, Baumann and Defendants stipulated to a new 
schedule for additional time to conduct standard discovery. 
2. Utah's savings statute provides that if "any action is timely 
filed and . . . the plaintiff fails . . . upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the action has expired, the 
plaintiff ... may commence a new action within one year after 
the ... failure." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-111(LexisNexis2012). 
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Baumann was to provide Defendants with expert disclosures by 
June 6, 2014, and expert discovery was to be completed by 
September 5, 2014. 
<[4 Both June 6 and September 5 passed, and Baumann failed 
to disclose expert witnesses and their corresponding reports. 
Then, on September 11, 2014, Defendants jointly moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that without designated expert 
witnesses Baumann could not establish the applicable standards 
of care, breach of those standards, or that the breach was the 
proximate cause of Baumann' s injuries. Baumann filed an 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Defendants 
responded on October 8, requesting that their motion be 
submitted for decision. Two days later, on October 10, Baumann 
filed approximately 150 pages of various documents with the 
court. The court scheduled a hearing on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on November 17, 2014. The day of the 
hearing, Baumann submitted an expert report applicable only to 
Kroger. No expert report applicable to Dr. Tayler was filed. 
<[5 At the November 17, 2014 hearing on Defendants' joint 
motion for summary judgment, Baumann' s husband sought 
permission to speak for her in court. The district court denied his 
request and granted a continuance for Baumann to find 
counsel-pro bono or otherwise.3 The court also told the parties 
that it would not consider any materials filed after October 8, 
2014, the date Defendants had filed their motion to submit for 
decision; that "the pleadings have closed on the motion"; and 
3. Baumann's husband asked to speak for Baumann "if there is 
no objection." Defendants objected to "a nonlawyer representing 
a pro se plaintiff." The court sustained the objection, explaining 
that while it was true that Baumann was "entitled to [speak for 
herself] under constitutional protection[,] if you have the 
assistance of an individual, [it] ought to be somebody that's 
licensed in the law." 
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that any new counsel would not "be at liberty to supplement this 
record" but would be there only "to speak on the question [that] 
has been filed." The court also permitted Baumann to file a 
written statement detailing her arguments before the court if she 
had not found counsel to speak for her. 
CU:6 At the rescheduled hearing on January 5, 2015, 
Baumann-still unrepresented by counsel-read a written 
statement to the court. She contended that summary judgment 
was not proper because she had provided documents reflecting 
a Social Security Administration decision granting her disability 
benefits. She also told the court that she did not designate expert 
witnesses or their reports timely because she "was just [trying] 
to save quite a few thousand dollars," "the facts would speak for 
themselves," and she thought "the Defense would want to move 
forward with also a less expensive and more timely speedier 
way of getting resolution to this case that's been personally hard 
on [her] also for eight years." Baumann asserted that in any 
event "[p]rocedural formalities are not the law." "In conclusion," 
she stated, "I believe that summary judgment is improper due to 
the fact that the defendants' basis is procedural not evidentiary ." 
CU:7 The district court granted Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, finding that Baumann had "failed to make 
expert disclosures" in accordance with the stipulation and rule 
26 and that there was "no good cause for [Baumann's] failure to 
make expert disclosures." "Therefore," the court ruled, Baumann 
"was precluded by Rule 26(d)(4) from using any undisclosed 
witness, document, or material in opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants." Because the 
"standards of care related to prescribing and dispensing blood 
pressure medication, and what neurological or other biological 
effects that blood pressure medications may have, are not within 
the common knowledge of laypersons," the district court found 
that "expert testimony is required in this case." Baumann, 
"having failed to make expert disclosures ... [thus] cannot make 
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a prima facie case for her healthcare malpractice claims." 
Baumann appeals the district court's order.4 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
18 Baumann-represented by counsel on appeal-contends 
that the district court abused its discretion when it "declined to 
permit" her to disclose and utilize an expert report applicable to 
Dr. Tayler and that it erred in its application of law when it 
refused to consider or admit her expert report applicable to 
Kroger. We review a district court's decision to impose sanctions 
under rule 26(d)(4) for abuse of discretion. Townhomes at Pointe 
Meadows Owners Ass'n v. Pointe Meadows Townhomes, LLC, 2014 
UT App 52, 113, 329 P.3d 815.5 
4. Baumann does not contest the district court's determination 
that expert witness testimony was necessary to prove her claims 
and, thus, that summary judgment was appropriate in the 
absence of such testimony, nor does Baumann contest the court's 
ruling that there was no good cause for her failure to disclose her 
expert witnesses. We, therefore, do not address those issues here. 
5. Townhomes at Pointe Meadows Owners Association v. Pointe 
Meadows Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App 52, 329 P.3d 815, was 
decided under the pre-2011 versions of rules 26 and 37. See id. 
113 n.2. Prior to 2011, rule 26 did not include a "failure to 
disclose" provision, as it does today. Thus, a party's failure to 
disclose an expert witness under rule 26(a) was then governed 
by rule 37(£): 
If a party fails to disclose a witness ... as required 
by Rule 26(a) ... that party shall not be permitted 
to use the witness . . . at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows 
good cause for the failure to disclose. 
(continued ... ) 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Dr. Tayler Expert Report 
19 Baumann argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by not allowing her to designate an additional expert 
( ... continued) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(£) (2010). In 2011, however, amendments to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure included a provision similar to 
rule 37(£) in rule 26(d)(4), which governs this case: 
If a party fails to disclose ... a [witness], that party 
may not use the undisclosed witness ... at any 
hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure. 
Id. R. 26(d)(4) (2012). Furthermore, as part of the 2015 
amendments, the former rule 37(£) was deleted, because "the 
effect of non-disclosure is adequately governed by Rule 26(d)." 
Id. R. 37 (2016) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments. 
Utah appellate decisions have referred to both rules 26 and 37 
when discussing the ramifications of a failure to disclose 
witnesses. The district court in this case referred to rule 26(d)(4), 
as do we. However, we also utilize rule 37(£) cases in our 
analysis because of their similar applicability. Because the 
substance of rule 26(d)(4) has remained unaltered since its 
inception, unless otherwise noted, we cite the 2016 version of the 
rule. 
Additionally, the accompanying note to the 2011 
amendments explains that the "may not use" language of rule 
26-like the "shall not be permitted to use" language of rule 
37-provides for a mandatory preclusion of materials, not a 
permissive sanction. See id. R. 26 (2012) advisory committee's 
note to 2011 amendments (stating that the noncompliant "party 
cannot use the undisclosed witness ... absent proof that" the 
failure was either harmless or for good cause (emphases added)). 
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report applicable to Dr. Tayler. This argument is unpreserved, 
however, as Baumann concedes in her reply brief.6 
<[10 Generally, we will not consider an issue on appeal unless 
it has been preserved. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011UT68, <[ 12, 266 
P.3d 828. "Our preservation rule promotes both judicial 
economy and fairness. The rule furthers judicial economy by 
giv[ing] the [district] court an opportunity to address the 
claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it prior to an appeal." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 
84, <[ 28, 299 P.3d 990 (alterations in original) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "The only exceptions to this 
general rule are instances involving exceptional circumstances or 
plain error." Id. <[ 27. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provide that "[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... a 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a), (a)(S)(B). 
Baumann' s opening brief provides us no such statement.7 
6. Baumann did not file a motion or otherwise request 
permission to designate an expert as to Dr. Tayler during the 
proceedings before the district court. 
7. In her reply brief, Baumann does argue that exceptional 
circumstances-her demonstrated "lack of understanding of the 
process and the significance of the schedule" and her ability as a 
disabled prose plaintiff-justify departure from the preservation 
rule. "It is well settled that issues raised by an appellant in the 
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are 
considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate 
court." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, <[ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Even so, while pro se appellants are entitled to "every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged ... , [a]s a 
general rule, a party who represents [herself] will be held to the 
same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified 
(continued ... ) 
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111 Furthermore, Baumann's specific argument-that the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to 
submit an expert report applicable to Dr. Tayler-cannot prevail; 
the district court could not have abused its discretion in not 
making a ruling it was never asked to make. We thus decline to 
review Baumann' s contentions as to an expert witness report 
applicable to Dr. Tayler. 
II. Kroger Expert Report 
112 The district court found that Baumann "failed to make 
expert disclosures" in accordance with the stipulation and rule 
26 and that there was "no good cause for [Baumann' s] failure to 
make expert disclosures." Accordingly, it precluded Baumann 
( ... continued) 
member of the bar." Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, 1 4, 283 
P.3d 539 (per curiam) (first alteration in original) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "Consequently, [r]easonable 
considerations do not include . . . attempt[ing] to redress the 
ongoing consequences of the party's decision to function in a 
capacity for which [she] is not trained." Id. (first and second 
alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Our supreme court has explained that 
a lay[person] acting as [her] own attorney does not 
require the court to interrupt the course of 
proceedings to translate legal terms, explain legal 
rules, or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing 
consequences of the party's decision to function in 
a capacity for which [she] is not trained. Judges 
cannot be expected to perform that function. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213-14 (Utah 1983). Thus, 
while a pro se plaintiff "has the right to appear pro se ... when a 
person chooses to do so, [she] must be held to the same standard 
as if [she] were represented by counsel." Johnson v. Aetna Cas. 
& Surety Co. of Hartford, 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981). 
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"from using any undisclosed witness, document, or material in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Defendants" under rule 26(d)(4). Baumann argues that this was 
an abuse of discretion. She argues specifically that the district 
court should have applied rule 16(d) instead of rule 26(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, 349 P.3d 
739. As the Coroles court stated, under rule 16(d), "a court 'may' 
impose a sanction described in rule 37(e) for a failure to abide by 
the scheduling order." Id. <JI 22. Under rule 26(d), however, a 
party who has failed to disclose a witness "may not use the 
undisclosed witness ... at any hearing or trial unless the failure 
is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) (emphasis added). Baumann argues that 
applying rule 16' s permissive standard rather than rule 26' s 
mandatory standard would have led to a more favorable result 
for her. 
<JI13 Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a 
party disclosing an expert witness "to submit a written report 
that contains specific information, such as the expert's 
qualifications and the basis for and substance of the expert's 
opinion." Townhomes at Pointe Meadows Owners Ass'n v. Pointe 
Meadows Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App 52, <JI 13, 329 P.3d 815 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B)). And importantly, as we stated 
above, "'Utah law mandates that a trial court exclude an expert 
witness report disclosed after expiration of the established 
deadline' unless the district court, in its discretion, determines 
that 'good cause excuses tardiness' or that the failure to disclose 
was harmless." Id. (quoting Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 
2009 UT App 347, <JI<JI 8, 23, 222 P.3d 775). 
<j{l 4 Critically, a district court has "broad discretion in 
selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations" under 
rule 26. Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, <JI 15, 981 P.2d 407 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Appellate 
courts may not interfere with such discretion unless ... there is 
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either an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for 
the trial court's ruling." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
c_n:15 Moreover, contrary to Baumann' s argument to the district 
court that bypassing her obligation to disclose her expert witness 
would have led to a speedier resolution in this case, Utah's 
supreme court-appointed advisory committee on the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure has stated that 
[m]ore complete disclosures increase the likelihood 
that the case will be resolved justly, speedily, and 
inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that 
a party fails properly to disclose provides a 
powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. 
This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this 
standard. Accordingly, although a trial court 
retains discretion to determine how properly to 
address this issue in a given case, the usual and 
expected result should be exclusion of the 
evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (2012) advisory committee's notes to 2011 
amendments. Thus, sound policy supports strict enforcement of 
this rule. 
c_n:16 So, too, do the facts of this case. This is an old case. 
Baumann's original claim arose in 2007. She filed a second suit 
under Utah's savings statute. Baumann also stipulated to a 
discovery schedule requiring her to disclose expert witnesses to 
Defendants by June 6, 2014, and providing that expert 
discovery-including expert witness depositions-would close 
on September 5, 2014. Baumann then failed to provide an expert 
witness or report as to either Kroger or Dr. Tayler. Defendants 
thus filed for summary judgment on September 11. After 
Baumann opposed Defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
Defendants submitted the motion for decision on October 8, and 
the court scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 17. 
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The day of the hearing, Baumann filed an expert report as to 
Kroger without seeking leave of court to do so-and contrary to 
the district court's order that it would not consider filings 
submitted after October 8. At the rescheduled January 5, 2015 
hearing, Baumann's arguments to the district court-that she 
was trying to dispose of the case economically and that 
"[p ]rocedural formalities are not the law" -were unpersuasive 
and ultimately, the district court precluded Baumann "from 
using any undisclosed witness, document, or material in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Defendants." 
':II17 Nevertheless, Baumann argues that under Coroles v. State, 
2015 UT 48, 349 P.3d 739, the district court should have applied 
rule 16(d), not rule 26(d)(4), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and that it abused its discretion in failing to do so. Baumann 
specifically argues that, according to Coroles, the source of the 
district court's authority to sanction her "for producing untimely 
discovery under a scheduling order" is rule 16(d), not rule 26(d). 
Baumann' s argument is similar to the appellant's argument in 
Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62, 370 
P.3d 963. While Sleepy Holdings dealt with initial disclosures and 
not an expert witness report, its analysis is apt and informs our 
decision here. 
':II18 In Sleepy Holdings, the appellant argued that the district 
court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence under rule 
26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that it "should 
instead have applied the discretionary sanctions found in rule 
16(d)." Id. ':II 19. This court explained that rule 16 "governs 
pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences," 
id. ':II 20, whereas rule 26 "governs initial disclosures and 
discovery," id. ':II 21. We indicated that the '"sanction of exclusion 
is automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show 
that the violation ... was either justified or harmless."' Id. 
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(emphasis added) (quoting Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, 
<JI 22, 265 P.3d 139).8 We further noted that the district court 
sanctioned the appellant, Sleepy Holdings, for failure to disclose 
and stated that "[t]he district court's ruling repeatedly cites rule 
26; it never mentions rule 16." Id. <JI 22. Thus, this court declined 
to apply Coroles, as Sleepy Holdings urged, because "Coroles did 
not interpret-or even mention-rule 26" and because rule 26 
appropriately authorized sanctions for failure to disclose. Id. 
<JI 23. 
<JI19 So too here, where the district court refused to allow 
Baumann to disclose or utilize any expert witnesses. The court's 
order references only rule 26, not rule 16. Thus, rule 26 is 
controlling here because Baumann failed to disclose her expert 
witness until the day of the hearing on Defendants' joint motion 
for summary judgment on November 17, without seeking the 
court's permission to do so. Consequently, the district court did 
not err in applying rule 26 when it found that Baumann was 
"precluded by Rule 26(d)(4) from using any undisclosed witness, 
document, or material" to contest summary judgment at that 
hearing. 
8. Baumann also argues that in addition to making a finding of 
no good cause, the district court was also required to make a 
finding of harmfulness. This, however, is not the case. See Sleepy 
Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62, <JI 21, 370 
P.3d 963. It is well settled that a district court's exclusion of 
materials may be supported if the court makes a finding that 
there is either no good cause for the failure or that the failure is 
harmful. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) (explaining that a "party 
may not use the undisclosed witness, document or material at 
any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure." (emphasis added)); Bodell 
Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, <JI 35, 215 P.3d 933. Thus, it is 
unnecessary for us to examine whether there was harm. This is 
not to suggest that the failure was harmless. 
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120 Furthermore, Bodell Construction Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 
52, 215 P.3d 933, supports the district court's characterization of 
Baumann' s action as a "failure to make expert report" 
disclosures rather than a failure to produce discovery timely 
under a scheduling order. In Bodell, the court affirmed the 
district court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert report in accordance 
with rule 37(£)-now subsumed in rule 26(d)(4)9-characterizing 
an expert report submitted only three weeks after close of fact 
discovery as a "failure to disclose." Id. 1113, 34-37, 40. Using 
the same metric, Baumann' s report was filed twenty-five weeks 
after the close of fact discovery. 
121 In this case, the district court's order did not address 
Baumann' s violation of the scheduling order, but instead relied 
upon rule 26(d)(4), stating that Baumann could not now use 
"any undisclosed witness, document, or material" to contest 
summary judgment. Thus, we believe Sleepy Holdings' 
framework provides us with an alternate, more precise way to 
approach the question of which rule applied in this case, i.e., not 
whether the district court made its ruling because Baumann 
violated a scheduling order or because she violated the rules of 
discovery, but because she did not disclose expert witnesses 
within the time confines of both the stipulated discovery 
schedule and the district court's order cutting off filings after 
October 8. See supra 1117-19. 
122 Because the district court correctly precluded Baumann 
from using her undisclosed expert witness report to contest 
summary judgment under rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, we affirm. 
9. See supra note 5 for our analysis of the applicability to this 
discussion of pre-2011 amendment cases affirming under rules 
26and37. 
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CONCLUSION 
123 Baumann' s argument as to any expert report applicable to 
Dr. Tayler was not preserved in the district court, and we 
therefore do not consider it. As to the expert report applicable to 
Kroger, under the order of the district court, rule 26(d)(4)-not 
rule 16(d)-of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied when 
Baumann failed to disclose the details of her proposed expert. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding her 
from using expert witness testimony to contest summary 
judgment under rule 26. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
20150078-CA 14 2016 UT App 165 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of July, 2016, a true and correct copy of the attached 
DECISION was sent by standard or electronic mail to be delivered to: 
TODD C. HILBIG 
ANDREA M. KEYSAR 
MORGAN MINNOCK RICE & JAMES 
thilbig@mmrm.com 
akeysar@mmrm.com 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
JOHN M. ZIDOW 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
ewilliams@williamsandhunt.com 
jzidow@williamsandhunt.com 
GREGORY W. STEVENS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
utlaw@aol.com 
HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD 
FOURTH DISTRICT, HEBER DEPT 
FOURTH DISTRICT, HEBER DEPT 
ATTN: JULI PATURZO 
heberinfo@utcourts.gov 
Judicial Secretary 
TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, HEBER DEPT, 130500017 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20150078-CA 
ADDENDUM B
District Court Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and Final Order and Judgment (Jan. 29, 2015)





ADDENDUM C
Transcript of Oral Argument Before the District Court
and Decision from the Bench (Jan. 5, 2015)

































ADDENDUM D
District Court Order (Dec. 22, 2014)




ADDENDUM E
Transcript of Oral Argument Before the District Court (Nov. 27, 2014)
























